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IN RE COOK AND THE FRANKLIN
PROCEEDING: NEW DOOR, SAME
DILAPIDATED HOUSE
Christopher Hawthorne* & Marisa Sacks**
The California Supreme Court’s decision in In re Cook was
supposed to bring about a sea change in the way trial courts conduct
Franklin mitigation hearings for youthful offenders. In fact, while Cook
changed the procedure for initiating a post-conviction Franklin
proceeding, little else has changed, including the lack of agreement
among attorneys concerning best practices in these proceedings, and a
less than less-than-enthusiastic response from the criminal defense bar.
Absent any guidance from higher courts, the Franklin proceeding is
limited by the personal and institutional energies and preferences of
judges, prosecutors, public defenders and private defense counsel. The
authors of this Article, who run a law school clinic dedicated to juvenile
post-conviction mitigation, believe that the implementation of Franklin
and Cook has not been as robust as needed, and that a more assertive,
nuanced, and in-depth set of practices are necessary. This Article
explores the underpinnings of the Franklin proceeding, the inadequacies
of the institutional response so far, the need and purpose for a more
robust set of practices related to Franklin, and recommendations for the
practices themselves.

* Christopher Hawthorne, Clinical Professor of Law and Director, Juvenile Innocence &
Fair Sentencing Clinic, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
** Marisa Sacks, Staff Attorney, Juvenile Innocence & Fair Sentencing Clinic, Loyola Law
School, Los Angeles. The authors would like to extend a special thanks to Kayla Burchuk for
suggesting this Article, and an equally special thanks to the students of the Juvenile Innocence &
Fair Sentencing Clinic, who fight every day to tell their clients’ mitigation stories in California
courts and prisons.

373

(7) 53.2_HAWTHORNE (DO NOT DELETE)

374

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

6/2/2020 5:02 PM

[Vol. 53:373

TABLE OF CONTENTS
THE JOURNEY TO COOK ................................................................... 380
MILLER V. ALABAMA ......................................................................... 380
CALIFORNIA’S RESPONSE TO MILLER............................................... 383
DEFINING ACCOUNTABILITY UPWARD ............................................ 389
BROWN V. PLATA .............................................................................. 390
PEOPLE V. FRANKLIN ........................................................................ 391
IN RE COOK AND THE REALITIES OF JUVENILE POSTCONVICTION LAW ................................................................. 392
ATTITUDES TOWARD FRANKLIN ....................................................... 396
JUDICIAL CONTEXTUALIZATION ...................................................... 399
THE LIMITED HORIZON OF PAROLE HEARINGS ................................ 401
HOW TO DO A FRANKLIN HEARING .................................................. 402
CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 407

(7) 53.2_HAWTHORNE (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

6/2/2020 5:02 PM

IN RE COOK AND THE FRANKLIN PROCEEDING

375

The California Supreme Court’s June 3, 2019, decision in In re
Cook1 was much anticipated by both the criminal defense and
prosecutorial bars.2 At issue was the fate of nearly 20,000 youthful
offenders serving long sentences in California prisons.3 Their
convictions had been final for some time. Could they use the writ of
habeas corpus to present mitigation evidence relevant to their longfinal convictions—evidence that should have been presented at their
original sentencing hearings, as much as thirty years earlier?4
These difficult questions derived from the nature of the Franklin
remedy itself, which at first glance is an odd, seemingly toothless
transmutation of a traditional sentencing hearing. When done
1. 441 P.3d 912 (Cal. 2019).
2. Anthony Maurice Cook was tried in the Superior Court of San Bernardino County for a
December 1, 2003, drive-by shooting. He was convicted of two counts of murder and one count of
attempted murder, with firearm enhancements and was sentenced to 125 years to life, despite
having been seventeen years old at the time of the crimes. Cook petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus in San Bernardino superior court, challenging his functional life without parole sentence
under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). After a summary denial, Cook refiled his petition
in the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Three. The court of appeal denied Cook’s petition,
holding that California Penal Code section 3051, following Montgomery v. Louisiana, 469 U.S.
916 (1984), cured the Eighth Amendment violation in his sentence, and that, therefore, he was not
entitled to habeas relief. In re Cook, No. G050907, 2016 WL 1384894 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 6,
2016). Cook sought review in the California Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court granted
Cook’s petition for review and transferred the matter back to the court of appeal on July 13, 2016,
“with directions to vacate its decision and consider whether petitioner is entitled to make a record
before the superior court of “mitigating evidence tied to his youth” in light of People v. Franklin.”
Docket
for
Cal.
Supreme
Court
Case
S234512,
available
at
https://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=0&doc_id=2141326&doc_n
o=S234512&request_token=NiIwLSEmXkw8WzBRSyNNWENIIFQ0UDxTICNeUztTUCAgCg
%3D%3D. On remand, the court of appeal determined that: (1) Cook was entitled to trial court
proceeding for making record of mitigating evidence tied to his youth; and (2) the proper vehicle
for seeking such a remedy was a petition for writ of habeas corpus. In re Cook, 212 Cal. Rptr. 3d
646 (Ct. App. 2017). The attorney general petitioned for review, which was granted on April 12,
2017. In re Cook, 441 P.3d at 912, 914. From April 12, 2017 until June 3, 2019, the question of
whether habeas corpus was the proper remedy for a Franklin proceeding lingered in California
courts, with some courts granting petitions (for example, in Los Angeles County), others denying
them, and still others staying the petitions.
3. The numbers are in dispute, but a December 2017 comprehensive spreadsheet of
California youthful offender parole hearing (YOPH) eligible inmates listed 19,290 individual
names. The actual number may be much higher. Of these nearly 20,000 inmates, approximately
6,500 were convicted for crimes committed while they were minors. See Excel Document, Cal. Bd.
of Parole Hearings, Eligible Youthful Offenders with YPED’s [Youth Parole Eligibility Dates],
Monday, December 18, 2017 (on file with authors); see also Beth Caldwell, Creating Meaningful
Opportunities for Release: Graham, Miller and California’s Youthful Offender Parole Hearings,
40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 245, 265–66 (2016) (“Whereas there are approximately 2,623
juvenile offenders serving life sentences in California, an estimated 6,500 California people in
California prisons qualify for YOPHs under S.B. 260,” speaking of youthful offenders under the
age of 18).
4. In re Cook, 441 P.3d at 914–15.
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properly, a Franklin proceeding looks like a death penalty mitigation
hearing: a detailed report by a mitigation expert, an equally detailed
report by a psychological professional, an extensive memorandum in
mitigation, followed by a live hearing with witnesses and crossexamination, with the People also presenting evidence. The
difference—and it is quite a difference—is that the Franklin hearing,
in contrast to Miller hearings, California Penal Code section
1170(d)(2) hearings, or even juvenile court transfer hearings, has no
judicial resolution: no change in sentence; no on-the-record findings;
no grant or denial of relief; not even a stray judicial remark concerning
the defendant’s character, rehabilitation, or prospects. By taking Cook
up on review, the California Supreme Court had the opportunity to
further classify to which phylum this judicial mutant belonged.5 The
result would affect every institutional actor in the state criminal justice
system.
If the court affirmed the survival of a post-conviction remedy
under People v. Franklin,6 prosecutors predicted a flood of mitigation
hearings, overwhelming trial courts with social and psychological
evidence that would not change the defendant’s sentence or parole
eligibility date by one day. Defense attorneys, on the other hand, were
concerned that inmates who were sentenced pre-Franklin and
therefore deprived of a mitigation hearing would be at a stark
disadvantage, compared to defendants sentenced after Franklin.7
5. The authors are aware that they are mixing metaphors by classifying Franklin as both a
house and a creature. On the other hand, there are creatures who are also houses, such as the hermit
crab (genus Paguroidea), which uses another creature’s shell as a house, as well as a part of its
person. In fact, Franklin has a very hermit crab-like existence, since it repurposes the disused shell
of a sentencing hearing to guarantee its own survival.
6. 370 P.3d 1053 (Cal. 2016).
7. Of course, ideally a youthful offender should exercise the right to present mitigation
evidence when it has a substantive effect on the offender’s sentence: either in a transfer hearing
from juvenile court (where applicable), pursuant to California Welfare & Institutions Code section
707 (a), or in a sentencing hearing in adult court, post-trial.
On the other hand, some intermediate appellate courts appear to consider youthful
offenders sentenced post-Franklin in exactly the same position as youthful offenders sentenced preFranklin. In People v. Medrano, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 653 (Ct. App. 2019), the Fourth District Court
of Appeal, Division Two, declared that the defendant, Michael Medrano—sentenced eighteen
months after Franklin was decided—had forfeited his right to present “mitigating youth-related
evidence” at his sentencing hearing, “whether by choice or inadvertence.” Id. at 658. All was not
lost, however: Medrano still had the right to “fil[e] a motion ‘for a Franklin proceeding under the
authority of section 1203.01.’” Id. To Medrano, on the other hand, a lot had been lost: specifically,
the right to have the trial court consider mitigating youth-related evidence and then resentence him.
The reasoning in Medrano was apparently so compelling that the First District Court of Appeal
reversed itself. People v. Carranza, No. A152211, 2019 WL 5867435 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2019),
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Ultimately, Cook resolved none of those issues, except one:
youthful offenders with final judgments—that is, youthful offenders
who have no more direct appeal rights—can still seek relief under
Franklin. The presentation of mitigation evidence will not change the
offenders’ sentences, but it will provide information relevant to their
future parole hearings. The filing to start the process will no longer be
a petition; it will now be a motion pursuant to California Penal Code
section 1203.01, connected to a theoretical case that will assume
corporeal form once the motion is filed and accepted by the court.8
Finally, the process will no longer be called a Franklin hearing; it will
be a Franklin “proceeding,” reflecting the fact that the judge makes no
ruling at the end of the process.9 The court—perhaps reflecting the

vacating 252 Cal. Rptr. 3d 919 (Ct. App. 2019). Like Medrano, Daniel Carranza (or rather, his
attorney) had failed to introduce youth-related mitigating evidence at his sentencing hearing, even
though he was sentenced after Franklin was decided. On appeal, Carranza argued that he was
“entitled to a limited remand to ‘make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth
offender parole hearing.’” Id. at 924 (citing Franklin, 370 P.3d at 1065).
The court agreed, stating that, “normally, a defendant prejudiced by counsel’s inaction in
the trial court may rely on the ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) framework to vindicate his
or her rights.” Id. at 926. However, because the Cook court had imposed “[r]estrictions on the use
of that doctrine in the Franklin context,” in part by declaring that the writ of habeas corpus was no
longer the appropriate vehicle for Franklin, “it [was] questionable whether an IAC claim remains
a viable method by which an offender can obtain access to a Franklin proceeding where his or her
counsel failed to request a Franklin proceeding.” Id. at 927. Accordingly, the court held that
Carranza had not forfeited his right to a Franklin proceeding; it was too important a right. Id. at
929.
Barely a month later, however, the First District Court of Appeal vacated its published
decision in Carranza, and issued an unpublished decision, agreeing with Medrano. The court,
adopting reasoning that was diametrically opposed to its earlier reasoning, declared that Carranza
had forfeited his right to a Franklin proceeding during sentencing—but he could still “seek such a
proceeding under section 1203.01.” Carranza, 2019 WL 5867435, at *7. Apparently, the Franklin
remedy was not an important enough right to survive the forfeiture analysis under People v. Scott,
885 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Cal. 1994), but the right survived anyway, only under section 1203.01.
Moreover, it does not appear that Carranza would have been resentenced, even if his case had been
remanded.
Therefore, while Medrano does not necessarily bestow an undying right to a Franklin
proceeding pursuant to section 1203.01, it does suggest that the remedy is fairly durable, even for
those defendants who should have sought to present youth-related mitigation evidence at their
original, post-Franklin sentencing hearings.
8. In re Cook, 441 P.3d at 922 (“[T]he proper avenue is to file a motion in superior court
under the original caption and case number, citing the authority of [California Penal Code] section
1203.01 and today’s decision.”).
9. Id. at 916 n.3 (“Franklin processes are more properly called ‘proceedings’ rather than
‘hearings.’ A hearing generally involves definitive issues of law or fact to be determined with a
decision rendered based on that determination. A proceeding is a broader term describing the form
or manner of conducting judicial business before a court. While a judicial officer presides over
a Franklin proceeding and regulates its conduct, the officer is not called upon to make findings of
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practice in San Bernardino County, where Cook originated—declared
that documentary submissions, not hearings, may be acceptable.10
Otherwise, very little has changed. To poach on the metaphor in the
title, the doorway to the house has been remodeled by a contractor
somewhat more concerned with cost than architectural integrity. Once
inside the house, the buyer—the inmate seeking Franklin relief, who
must live with the results—will find the interior unchanged but will
still find plenty to criticize in the details.
Specifically, the California Supreme Court’s opinion admits that
post-conviction Franklin still exists, but it does not say whether the
remedy is essential. In fact, it leaves that deeper question
conspicuously unanswered. This is not surprising; after all, the
California Supreme Court created the Franklin hearing in a few
paragraphs at the tail end of a largely negative opinion, one that spent
most of its length explaining why the defendant, Tyris Lamar Franklin,
could not get a resentencing hearing pursuant to Miller. Could 20,000
mitigation hearings hang on such a slender thread?
Through its light-handed treatment of Franklin trial procedure,
was the California Supreme Court signaling that it really didn’t care
about this remedy? Or was the court, through its gnomic remarks about
judicial discretion, actually telling courts that the remedy—still in its
infancy—requires deeper and more detailed examination, not by the
California Supreme Court, but by the lower courts and attorneys
tasked with carrying it out?11
fact or render any final determination at the proceeding’s conclusion. Parole determination are left
to the Board.” (citations omitted)).
10. Id. at 916.
11. It is also possible that the court had been reading John F. Pfaff’s groundbreaking book,
Locked In. See JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND
HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017). Pfaff, a Professor at Fordham Law School, makes a
number of innovative and useful points about mass incarceration, which contrast with what he calls
“The Standard Story.” Id. at 21–123 (arguing that “The Standard Story,” particularly as constructed
by Michelle Alexander, MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012), focuses mistakenly on low-level drug offenses and the
federal criminal justice system as the drivers of mass incarceration). One point Pfaff makes
repeatedly is that felony prosecutions that result in prison sentences represent a massive transfer of
fiscal liability from the county (which pays for judges, prosecutors and trials) to the state (which
pays for prisons and parole hearings). PFAFF, supra, at 142–143. He goes on to suggest one
motivation for California’s Public Safety Realignment Act of 2011, which mandated that counties,
not the state, shoulder the responsibility for incarcerating low-level offenders. Id. at 150–151.
“Lifers,” (those serving life sentences) however, were still the financial responsibility of
state prisons, not county jails. However, in People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291 (Cal. 2012), and
People v. Gutierrez, 324 P.3d 245 (Cal. 2014), the California Supreme Court crafted a judicial
remedy for juveniles who had committed violent offenses, putting the financial and political burden
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One stubborn fact remains: The court did create the Franklin
proceeding, when it could have simply denied relief. Moreover, the
court did not simply call upon the legislature to enact more robust
mitigation investigation during the parole process; it ordered trial
courts to hold hearings, appoint attorneys and experts, and submit the
resultant evidence package to the Board of Parole Hearings. Then,
three years later, the court reaffirmed the existence of the remedy,
whether we call it a “Franklin hearing” or an “evidence preservation
proceeding.”
If mitigation evidence is to be presented at such a proceeding, that
evidence must have value, at least to the Board of Parole Hearings.
But the selection of venue is also significant. If the evidence has no
value to the trial court, why present it there? This strongly suggests
that the Franklin proceeding is not about parole; it’s about sentencing.
Specifically, the proceeding exists to change the conversation about
the oversentencing of youth, one case and one defendant at a time.
Through repetition, context, and the repetition of context, the Franklin
hearing is aimed squarely at the institutional actors who committed
thousands of youthful offenders to California prisons. The fact that
Franklin is a soft revolution does not make it less of a revolution.
Therefore, defense attorneys and willing clients need to keep
demanding investigation, expert appointments, and hearings, so that
they can continue to create the mitigation context for future sentencing
hearings.
This Article will trace the contours of the court’s ostensible
holdings in Franklin and Cook, while also attempting to answer the
deeper question about the future of the remedy. First, this Article will
of remedying mass incarceration on county courts and prosecutors. In response, the legislature—
partly under pressure from the California District Attorneys Association—created the Youthful
Offender Parole Hearing, returning the burden to state prisons and parole boards to decide which
youthful offenders needed to be released. Franklin returned some of that burden to counties, by
requiring attorneys and courts to develop mitigation evidence that would eventually be used by the
state Board of Parole Hearings. As argued below, Cook appears to attenuate the Franklin remedy,
and its language suggests that part of the motivation for that attenuation is to ease the burden on
county courts, allowing them to simply accept submissions of documents, in lieu of actual hearings.
See in re Cook, 441 P.3d 912, 922 (Cal. 2019) (citing Franklin, 370 P.3d at 1065) (“[In managing
a Franklin proceeding, t]he court may, for example, require an offer of proof regarding the evidence
the offender seeks to present, so that it can determine whether such evidence is relevant to youthrelated factors and meaningfully adds to the already available record. It may also determine whether
testimony is ‘appropriate’, or if other types of evidentiary submissions will suffice.” (citation
omitted)). As discussed in more detail below, in the opinion of these authors, evidentiary
submissions rarely suffice.
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trace California’s journey to the holding in Cook. Specifically, it will
analyze how the triangulation of watershed California Supreme Court
precedent, the state’s rapidly changing legislative landscape, and
revelatory legal attitudes toward both the justice system and prison
overcrowding led to the Franklin and Cook decisions. Next, this
Article will address the seemingly shared attitudes of many defense
attorneys and prosecutors that the Franklin remedy is basically
administrative and has very little (if any) bearing on legal (or even
moral) outcomes. In doing so, the authors also hope to explain the
historical policies and practices that gave rise to these persistent
attitudes, and why they need to change. Last, this Article will detail
what the authors believe to be best practices for litigating the Franklin
remedy from beginning to end.
THE JOURNEY TO COOK
At issue in Cook was a basic question: does a youthful offender
have a post-conviction right to a Franklin proceeding? And along with
it, a more procedural question: was the writ of habeas corpus the
proper vehicle to pursue such a right? To understand why these
questions are being asked at all, it is necessary to examine two seminal
cases: Miller v. Alabama12 and Brown v. Plata.13
MILLER V. ALABAMA
Miller v. Alabama, decided by the United States Supreme Court
in 2012, was both a culmination of years of advocacy and the
foundation for every juvenile justice reform that came after it. While
Miller now seems like a treasure house of policy, rules, and helpful
quotations, the opinion itself was narrow, elliptical, and politically
astute. Justice Elena Kagan, less than two years into her tenure as a
Justice, wrote the opinion, which steered a careful middle course
between two extremes: on one hand, banning juvenile life without the
possibility of parole (LWOP) outright, or on the other, declaring
juvenile LWOP constitutional and leaving any further reforms to the
states.
Instead, Justice Kagan declared only that mandatory LWOP for
juveniles was unconstitutional. The holding left judges free to
12. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
13. 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
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sentence juveniles to LWOP, but abrogated state statutes that
mandated LWOP as the only penalty for a juvenile convicted of
serious crimes. Certain states—“mandatory” states, such as Michigan,
Pennsylvania, Louisiana and Alabama—would have to amend their
juvenile LWOP statutes.14 In a 5-4 decision, Justice Kagan was joined
in the majority by Justices Breyer, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and
Sotomayor. Justice Breyer filed a concurrence, in which Justice
Sotomayor joined. Justices Alito, Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas filed
various dissenting opinions.
In arriving at its conclusion, the Court relied on two lines of
precedent. First, it reaffirmed its long-standing commitment to
considering the status of children when construing their rights under
the Constitution, asserting that “children are constitutionally different
from adults for purposes of sentencing” and thus “less deserving of the
most severe punishments.”15
The second line of precedent was grounded in the growing
scientific consensus that, regardless of their crimes, children are less
culpable and have greater prospects for reform because of their
“hallmark features.”16 Specifically, children are less mature and thus
prone to “recklessness, impulsivity and heedless risk-taking.”17
Children “are more vulnerable to . . . negative influences and outside
pressures.”18 And finally, children are “less fixed” in their character
and consequently more capable of change than adults.19 These
“distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications
for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders.”20
Therefore, “imposition of a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile
offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children.”21
14. See Miller, 567 U.S. 460, 482, 486 & nn.13–15 (noting that twenty-nine jurisdictions had
mandatory LWOP statutes for juveniles, including: Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, and the federal government).
15. Id. at 471 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)).
16. Id. at 471, 477.
17. Id. at 461 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2004)).
18. Id. at 471 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569); see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (quoting
Roper, 543 U.S. at 569).
19. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570); see also Graham, 560 U.S. at
89 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).
20. Miller, 567 U.S. at 472.
21. Id. at 479; see generally Brief for the American Psychological Association, American
Psychiatric Association, and National Association of Social Workers as Amici Curiae in Support
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As is often the case, the good stuff was in the details. Justice
Kagan did not simply make a broad statutory declaration; she made a
test—albeit a test couched in negative, precatory language—that
would require skilled advocacy to achieve any real meaning. In
discussing why mandatory juvenile LWOP violated the individualized
sentencing requirement of Roper v. Simmons22 and Graham v.
Florida,23 she noted that, with a mandatory LWOP sentence, all
children would be treated the same: as irredeemable.24 To avoid this
unconstitutional result, she suggested that a court could consider
certain factors that would allow it to sort out juveniles who were
“irreparably corrupt” from those who only appeared to be corrupt,
because of their transient, adolescent qualities.25 This apparent
corruption in youth manifests for a variety of reasons: because of
childhood trauma, mental illness, peer threats, and most importantly,
the immaturity that makes so many children appear to be callous,
inappropriate, and even monstrous.26
But this list of subject areas—which has since become reified into
“the Miller factors”—was not the most important policy statement in
a case full of policy statements. Most important for juvenile justice
reform was a cautionary phrase at the end of the opinion: “[G]iven all
we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision about children’s
diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think
appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible
penalty will be uncommon.”27
of Petitioners at 4, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (noting that “[i]t is increasingly clear
that adolescent brains are not yet fully mature in regions and systems related to higher-order
executive functions such as impulse control, planning ahead, and risk avoidance”); Graham, 560
U.S. at 82 (“The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile
offender who did not commit homicide.”); Roper, 543 U.S at 578 (“The Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18
when their crimes were committed.”).
22. 543 U.S. 551 (2004).
23. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
24. Miller, 567 U.S. at 478.
25. See id. at 477.
26. See id.
27. Id. at 479 (emphasis added). This phrase—declaring that juvenile LWOP should be
“uncommon”—is straight out of death penalty jurisprudence, as is much of the reasoning in Roper,
Graham, and Miller. These similarities are outside the scope of this Article, but the idea that
extreme sentences ought to be “rare” or “uncommon”—and that the determination of who receives
these “rare” penalties starts with Justice Byron White’s concurrence in Furman v. Georgia, decided
not long after the reinstatement of the death penalty, following a nationwide moratorium. Justice
White, understandably, was concerned that the death penalty was being imposed arbitrarily on
defendants, without consideration for the comparative gravity of the crime involved, or the
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The call for juvenile LWOP to be “uncommon” changed Miller
from a mere technical opinion to a call to arms. Changing juvenile
LWOP from mandatory to discretionary was an order that could be
fulfilled in a single legislative session, making sure it was rare would
require years of litigation, client by client, case by case. It would need
an army of lawyers, all pushing in the same direction.
CALIFORNIA’S RESPONSE TO MILLER
Many of those lawyers would be in California. A 2010 study by
the National Conference of State Legislatures found that, in raw
numbers, California had the fifth highest juvenile LWOP prison
population in the United States, with 250 juveniles serving the
sentence.28 Other studies placed the number over 300.29 Although this
high number is to some degree a function of California’s large
population, other big states did not find it necessary to lock up children
for the rest of their lives. Texas, despite its enthusiasm for the adult
death penalty, did not have a similar zest for juvenile LWOP. The
study noted above found that, in 2010, Texas had only five juvenile
offenders serving life without the possibility of parole.30
California, however, did not confine itself to sentencing juveniles
to “actual LWOP.” Because of California’s peculiar constellation of
sentencing laws, the state had an even bigger problem than juvenile
LWOP: “functional juvenile LWOP.” A “functional LWOP” sentence
is one where the offender theoretically is eligible for parole, but where
the offender’s minimum eligible parole date occurs outside of the
individual characteristics of the offender. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious
crimes and that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed
from the many cases in which it is not.”). Those themes—that the death penalty be imposed with
“great infrequency” and the necessity of “distinguishing [those] few cases” from far more common
non-death cases are echoed in the Miller Court’s clear directives to lower courts: “[W]e think
appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty [i.e., LWOP] will
be uncommon,” and “[W]e require [the sentencing court] to take into account how children are
different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in
prison.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 479–80.
28. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE
(JLWOP) 1–17 (2010), https://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/jlwopchart.pdf. The other states with
large juvenile LWOP populations are Florida (266), Illinois (103), Louisiana (335), Michigan
(346), Missouri (116), and Pennsylvania (444). Id. at 4–9, 12.
29. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WHEN I DIE . . . THEY’LL SEND ME HOME 1 (2012),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/crd0112webwcover.pdf (citing 301 juvenile
offenders serving LWOP in California prisons as of 2012).
30. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 28, at 14.
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offender’s expected natural lifespan.31 The California Supreme Court
has never defined what the minimum age of parole eligibility must be
for a juvenile to have functional LWOP, but in People v. Contreras,32
the court emphatically stated that fifty years to life is functional
LWOP, though shorter sentences may also qualify.33
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss all the reasons that
California sentences so many juveniles to very long sentences.
However, a relatively cursory review of California sentencing laws
from the 1990s to the present day should give a sense of how harsh
sentencing laws (often passed by initiative) and the hallmark qualities
of youth combine to put many children in prison for the rest of their
lives.
First, starting in the late 1970s, California passed a series of crime
bills, usually with pithy names: “The Death Penalty Act” (1978); “The
Victim’s Bill of Rights” (1982); “The STEP [Street Terrorism
Enforcement and Prevention] Act” (1988); “The Crime Victims
Justice Reform Act” (1990); “Three Strikes and You’re Out” (1994);
the “Juvenile Crime Initiative” (2000); and “Marsy’s Law” (2008).
While the intent of each of these bills or initiatives was to strengthen
the hand of law enforcement and prosecutors, lengthen sentences for
individual crimes or activities, enhance the rights of crime victims and
their families, and trim away the rights of criminal defendants, the
combined effect of each law was magnified by the others.34
So, it may seem reasonable that an offender who attempts to
murder another human being should receive a sentence of life in
prison, with a minimum sentence of seven, ten, or even fifteen years.
It may also be reasonable that an offender who uses a firearm should
receive an enhanced sentence. It is arguable that persons who
discharge weapons from or into motor vehicles, who shoot at groups
of people, or who participate in a violent crime that results in the death

31. In People v. Caballero, the California Supreme Court found that Rodrigo Caballero’s
sentence of 110 years to life was the “functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence,” and
that, therefore, he “would have no opportunity to ‘demonstrate growth and maturity’ to try to secure
his release.” People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 295 (Cal. 2012). The court did not, however,
declare what was the bottom limit of “functional LWOP.” Id.
32. 411 P.3d 445 (Cal. 2018).
33. Id. at 455.
34. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28; see also CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION
GUIDE FOR 1994, GENERAL ELECTION 32–37 (1994), https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=2090&context=ca_ballot_props.
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of the victim of that crime should also be punished more severely.35 It
may also deter youths from joining street gangs if they know that,
when they commit a crime along with fellow gang members, they may
all receive an enhanced sentence.36
What is far less reasonable is that none of these harsher
sentencing provisions were ever harmonized with the others. Many
sentences and enhancements were “mandatory consecutive”
sentences, meaning that, although a defendant might fire a single
bullet at a group of people and hit no one, every person in that group
was a potential victim, and every victim required the defendant to
serve a separate sentence, one after the other, usually until the offender
was old, dying, or dead.37
Old, dying, or dead, even if he was seventeen years old at the time
of the crime. Because, make no mistake, juvenile offenders were the

35. These situations are reflected in California Penal Code section 190.2, as “special
circumstances,” which justify the imposition of the death penalty for adults, or the use of LWOP
for juveniles. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (listing “special circumstances” that apply
to homicides committed by shooting from a motor vehicle (section 190.2(a)(21)), involving
multiple victims (section 190.2(a)(2)), or while engaged in certain enumerated felonies
(section 190.2(a)(17))).
36. See id. § 190.2(a)(22) (allowing imposition of the death penalty or LWOP, if a homicide
is “carried out to further the activities of [a] criminal street gang”). Discouraging gang membership
was an essential part of the STEP Act, as the legislative findings indicate: “It is the intent of the
Legislature in enacting this chapter to seek the eradication of criminal activity by street gangs by
focusing upon patterns of criminal gang activity and upon the organized nature of street gangs,
which together, are the chief source of terror created by street gangs.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.20;
1988 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1256 (West) (“This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the
‘California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act.’”).
37. Offenders in California who are convicted of violent offenses often serve consecutive
sentences for crimes involving multiple victims, and the court does not need to explain on the record
why consecutive sentences are being imposed. See, e.g., People v. Arviso, 247 Cal. Rptr. 559, 560–
61 (Ct. App. 1988). Moreover, weapon enhancements—as long as twenty-five years to life—until
2018, had to be imposed consecutively and could not be struck by the trial judge. See CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 12022.5, 12022.53 (West 2019); see also, People v. Robbins, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468, 482
(Ct. App. 2018) (acknowledging that, following the passage of California Senate Bill 620, judges
have the discretion to strike weapon enhancements under Penal Code section 1385). These long
sentences are a tremendous burden on both inmates and facilities. Thanks to excessively long
sentences, the United States has more prisoners fifty-five years of age and older than ever before.
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OLD BEHIND BARS: THE AGING PRISON POPULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 6 (2012), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usprisons0112webwcover_0.pdf
(“[T]he number of sentenced federal and state prisoners who are age 65 or older grew an astonishing
94 times faster than the total sentenced prisoner population between 2007 and 2010. The older
prison population increased by 63 percent, while the total prison population grew by 0.7 percent
during the same period.”). Inevitably, life sentences, especially life without parole sentences, make
the problem worse; life sentences contemplate—if not guarantee—the likelihood that an offender
will die of old age in prison. See id. at 33–36.
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effective targets of these laws.38 Youth are far more likely to
participate in street gangs, more likely to commit a crime in a group
of youths and commit a crime against another group of youths, more
likely to fire into or out of a motor vehicle, and more likely to be in a
group in which one member is engaged in those activities. Youth are
also more likely to have undiagnosed mental illness, autism spectrum
disorder, ADHD, or PTSD, which might lead them to commit these
acts.39
An example of this tendency is the case of sixteen-year-old
Rodrigo Caballero, who, by committing a crime, gave his name to the
case, People v. Caballero.40 Caballero, also known by his moniker,
“Dreamer,” was a member of the Vario Lancas street gang; his
intended victims were members of the rival Val Verde Park street
gang. On June 6, 2007, Caballero jumped out of a car on a street corner
in Palmdale, California, and shouted “Lancas” at a group of five
youths.41 One of the youths, Carlos Vargas, responded by shouting
“Val Verde.”42 Caballero fired a gun at the group, hitting one of the
youths, Adrian Bautista, in the back and shoulder.43
Caballero admitted to an investigating officer that he had
committed the shooting. At trial, he testified that he was “straight
trying to kill somebody,” but then also said that he had fired at the
group only to scare them.44 Caballero, who was diagnosed by two
mental health professionals as suffering from “schizophrenia,
paranoid type,” was found to be too delusional to assist his attorney.45
After approximately six months of antipsychotic medication,
Caballero was found competent to stand trial and was convicted of
“three counts of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted
murder, with findings that he personally and intentionally discharged

38. See, e.g., Sarah A. Kellogg, Note, Just Grow up Already: The Diminished Culpability of
Juvenile Gang Members After Miller v. Alabama, 55 B.C. L. REV. 265, 281–82 (2014) (noting that
California’s STEP Act disproportionately penalized juvenile offenders, and arguing that such an
approach is categorically banned under Miller).
39. See generally Lee A. Underwood & Aryssa Washington, Mental Illness and Juvenile
Offenders, 13 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. PUB. HEALTH 228 (2016).
40. 282 P.3d 291 (Cal. 2012).
41. Id. at 293.
42. Id.
43. People v. Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920, 922 (Ct. App. 2011), rev’d, 282 P.3d 291 (Cal.
2012).
44. Id. at 924.
45. Id. at 921.
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a firearm, inflicted great bodily injury upon one victim, and committed
the crimes for the benefit of a criminal street gang.”46
Caballero was sentenced as follows: fifteen years to life for each
of three potential victims, including Adrian Bautista, to run
consecutively.47 For each of the victims, he received a firearm
enhancement: twenty-five years to life for possessing and personally
discharging a firearm and causing great bodily injury to one of the
victims.48 His aggregate sentence was 110 years to life, making him
eligible for parole no earlier than his 126th birthday.49
It is notable, in passing, that Caballero was in many ways a classic
youthful offender. He was in a street gang.50 He was traveling with a
group of other youths in a car.51 He jumped out of that car to shoot
into another group of youths, who obliged him by identifying
themselves as rival gang members.52 Finally, Caballero was floridly
schizophrenic, unmedicated, and initially unable to help his attorney,
yet he was found competent to stand trial, and his mental health had
no effect on his sentence.53 The court of appeal affirmed his sentence,
declaring that it was “not unconstitutional.”54
The California Supreme Court, fresh on the heels of the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, instead turned
to an earlier Supreme Court decision, People v. Graham, which
categorically banned LWOP sentences for juveniles who committed
“non-homicide crimes.”55 While Graham never said that functional
LWOP was covered by its holding, the California Supreme Court,
using language from Graham, declared that “a state must provide a
juvenile offender ‘with some realistic opportunity to obtain release’
from prison during his or her expected lifetime.”56 Because Caballero

46. Id. at 920 (first citing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 186.22(b)(1)(C), 187(a) (West 2014); then
citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 664(a) (West 2010); and then citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.53(b)–
(d) (West 2012)).
47. Caballero, 282 P.3d at 293.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. People v. Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920 (Ct. App. 2011), rev’d, 282 P.3d 291 (Cal.
2012).
54. Id. at 924–27.
55. Caballero, 282 P.3d at 293.
56. Id. at 295 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010)).
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did not receive this opportunity, the court’s remedy was that he, as
well as all
[d]efendants who were sentenced for crimes they committed
as juveniles who seek to modify life without parole or
equivalent de facto sentences already imposed[,] may file
petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court in order
to allow the court to weigh the mitigating evidence in
determining the extent of incarceration required before
parole hearings.57
Although Caballero’s holding was relatively narrow—it only
applied to the perhaps 3,000 juvenile offenders who were serving
functional LWOP—the effect of the decision was stark: every juvenile
offender who met these criteria would be entitled to a resentencing
hearing in a trial court.58
Whether this development was a good thing depends on whom
you asked. Defense attorneys immediately filed petitions for their
clients and began to prepare for mitigation hearings. Judges and
prosecutors may not have been so sanguine. Suddenly, instead of
facing hearings for fewer than 300 juveniles serving LWOP, they were
looking at hearings possibly stretching on for decades.
Faced with the prospect of a re-reckoning with thousands of
excessive juvenile sentences, the Los Angeles County District
Attorney’s Office immediately sponsored a bill (Assembly Bill 1276)
that would have offered all juvenile non-homicide offenders a parole
hearing at twenty-five years of incarceration, regardless of the
seriousness of the crime, mitigation evidence, or length of sentence—
a “parole fix.”59 Juvenile justice advocates, on the other hand,
proposed an alternative bill (Senate Bill 260) that would have given
every juvenile offender serving an adult prison sentence a
resentencing hearing, excluding certain offenders, such as juveniles
serving LWOP (already covered by Penal Code section 1170(d)(2)
and Miller), or juveniles who were convicted of first degree murder
with special circumstances.60

57. Id. at 295–96.
58. See id.
59. See ASSEMB. COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 1276, 2013–
2014 Reg. Sess., at 5 (Cal. 2013–2014).
60. S. COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL NO. 260, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess.,
at 4 (Cal. 2013–2014).
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How the legislature combined the two above bills to create the
bill that ultimately became law—an amended version of Senate Bill
260 that created the Youthful Offender Parole Hearing—is beyond the
scope of this Article.61 But it is within the scope of this Article to
observe that, from the very beginning, when faced with dealing with
excessive juvenile sentences in county superior courts, prosecutors
chose to hand the responsibility for these sentences back to the Board
of Parole Hearings, and the state took on that responsibility.62 This
handoff occurred because of the confluence of two forces, described
below.
DEFINING ACCOUNTABILITY UPWARD
The first of these two forces is more accurately described as a
tendency: the tendency of institutional actors to transfer difficult
responsibilities to other institutional actors. By quite a wide margin,
Los Angeles County has sentenced more juveniles to long sentences
in adult prisons than any other county in California.63 If anyone was
going to feel the pain of resentencing hearings for juvenile offenders,
it would be Los Angeles County. John Pfaff, in his excellent book,
Locked In, identifies a similar widespread tendency for counties to
shift the burden of incarceration to states.64 Naturally, having already
shifted that burden, Los Angeles County had no desire to take it up
once again, in the form of resentencing hearings. Much better to let
the state-controlled, state-funded Board of Parole Hearings wrestle
with the problem.

61. S.B. No. 260, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013–2014).
62. As noted in several places in this Article, the California Supreme Court’s Franklin
decision, like “Realignment,” may have been part of an effort by the state to shift responsibility
back to the counties.
63. Data released by the California Department of Corrections in October 2016 calculated the
number of incarcerated offenders eligible for Youthful Offender Parole Hearings. By this time,
these hearings covered offenders up to the age of twenty-five. But the contrast is still startling. Los
Angeles County had 11,808 eligible youthful offenders. The next largest population was from
Riverside County, with 1,989 eligible youthful offenders. See Excel Document, Cal. Bd. of Parole
Hearings, supra note 3.
64. See JOHN F. PFAFF, supra note 11. Pfaff notes that one of the causes of oversentencing,
and the seeking of excessive sentences by prosecutors, is that the county, which imposes the
excessive prison term, is relieved from the difficulty of paying for that prison term, because prisons
are administered and funded by the state. Id. at 143.
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BROWN V. PLATA
And the state of California was already dealing with this very
formidable problem, in the form of prison overcrowding.65 As the
original Committee Report for Senate Bill 260 noted,
For the last several years, severe overcrowding in
California’s prisons has been the focus of evolving and
expensive litigation relating to conditions of confinement.
On May 23, 2011, the United States Supreme Court ordered
California to reduce its prison population to 137.5 percent of
design capacity within two years from the date of its ruling,
subject to the right of the state to seek modifications in
appropriate circumstances.66
These anodyne, technical-sounding numbers in fact described a
massive human rights crisis in California prisons. In 2011, California
had a “design capacity” of 80,000 beds, with a prison population of
156,000.67 Two lawsuits by California prisoners, demanding better
medical and mental health care,68 morphed into the monumental
prison rights case, Brown v. Plata.69 On May 23, 2011, the United
States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision along partisan lines, ordered
California to reduce the prison population to about 110,000 inmates:
still very crowded and unhealthy, but less blatantly hellish.70 The
deadline for this reduction was June 27, 2013, and at the time of Senate
Bill 260’s introduction, Governor Brown was far behind schedule.71
This, then, is the second force that created the Youthful Offender
Parole Hearing—state-level political control. Resentencing hearings
were time-consuming and costly and could not efficiently release even
a fraction of the more than 20,000 youthful offenders in the California
prison system. Seeing an opportunity to do justice and keep his prisons

65. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 502 (2011).
66. S. COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL NO. 260, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess.,
at 4 (Cal. 2013–2014).
67. Plata, 563 U.S. at 501–02.
68. The original lawsuits were Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (filed
in 1990, alleging inadequate mental health treatment for California prisoners), and Plata v. Davis,
329 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003) (filed in 2001, alleging inadequate medical treatment for California
prisoners). The findings and orders of the three-judge panel at issue in Brown v. Plata applied to
both lawsuits. Plata, 563 U.S. at 500.
69. Id. at 493.
70. Id. at 541–45.
71. S. COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL NO. 260, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess.,
at 5 (Cal. 2013–2014).
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away from federal control, Governor Brown signed Senate Bill 260,
Senate Bill 261 and finally, Assembly Bill 1308, which made those
inmates eligible for Youthful Offender Parole Hearings.72
Senate Bill 260 renders juvenile offenders serving non-LWOP
sentences eligible for a youthful offender parole hearing at their
fifteenth, twentieth, or twenty-fifth year of incarceration, depending
on the length of their controlling offense.73 Significantly, per
California Penal Code section 4801(c), the legislature requires the
Board of Parole Hearings to “give great weight to the diminished
culpability of juveniles as compared to adults, the hallmark features of
youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the
[offender].”74 Senate Bill 260 was intended to ensure eligible juvenile
offenders will “have a meaningful opportunity to obtain release” when
that offender has gained sufficient maturity.75
PEOPLE V. FRANKLIN
Following the passage of Senate Bill 260, the California Supreme
Court handed down a two-part decision in People v. Franklin.76 First,
the court held that the procedures created by Senate Bill 260,
specifically the provisions that entitle an inmate to a youthful offender
parole hearing, cured the constitutional error in sentencing by giving
the petitioner the right to a parole hearing after serving twenty-five
years of his sentence.77 Second, the court held that remand was
72. Senate Bill 260, approved by the governor on September 16, 2013, provides early parole
hearings for juvenile offenders whose commitment offenses occurred when they were under the
age of 18. See S.B. No. 260, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013–2014). Senate Bill 261, approved
by the governor on October 3, 2015, extends those hearings to youthful offenders whose
commitment offenses occurred when they were under the age of 23. See S.B. No. 261, 2015–2016
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015–2016). Finally, Assembly Bill 1308, approved by the governor on October
11, 2017, extended the above protections to youthful offenders “who committed those specified
crimes when they were 25 years of age or younger.” See A.B. No. 1308, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2017–2018).
73. S.B. No. 260, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013–2014). Controlling offense means the
offense or enhancement for which any sentencing court imposed the longest term of imprisonment.
A “controlling offense” does not refer to an offense, per se, but instead to a term of years, with or
without a life term. Therefore, the longest component of an inmate’s sentence may be, and often is,
a gang or weapon enhancement.
74. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801(c) (West Supp. 2019).
75. People v. Franklin, 370 P.3d 1053, 1060 (Cal. 2016).
76. Id. at 1053.
77. Id. at 1062; In re Cook, 441 P.3d 912, 913–14 (Cal. 2019). It is still not clear whether
Franklin’s sentence was constitutional because he would have the opportunity to put mitigation
evidence into the record, or whether his sentence was constitutional because of his future parole
hearing, and the opportunity to put evidence into the record flowed solely from that statutory right.
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required to determine whether the trial court afforded the youthful
offender sufficient opportunity, pursuant to Miller and its progeny, to
develop a record of mitigating evidence relevant to his eventual
youthful offender parole hearing.78 Later, in People v. Rodriguez,79 the
court clarified that, essentially, any sentencing hearing conducted
before the passage of Senate Bill 260 was “not adequate in light of the
purpose of [the youthful offender parole hearing law].”80 In other
words, every youthful offender sentenced pre-2016 had to receive the
benefits of Franklin. The question was, how?
IN RE COOK AND THE REALITIES OF JUVENILE POST-CONVICTION LAW
Initially, relief under Franklin was cognizable under the postconviction vehicle used by nearly every prisoner seeking freedom: by
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. However, as the state argued in
Cook, Franklin was not intended to provide a remedy for an
unconstitutional or illegal sentence, and therefore, habeas corpus was
not the proper means to initiate a Franklin proceeding.81 Instead, it
argued, Franklin was merely an “evidence-gathering procedure”
meant only to aid the Board of Parole Hearings in deciding about a
juvenile offender’s suitability for parole.82 Such a purpose did not
deserve the majesty of “The Great Writ.”83
That, coincidentally, is also the argument of the numerous
defense attorneys who argue for the simplified, administrative version
of “bundling.” “Bundling” (a neologism created by these authors)
describes a common practice in Franklin “litigation.” The defense
attorney chooses not to provide expert reports, social histories, and
written pleadings to the court; decides not to present the experts and
their findings in live testimony; and makes no oral argument on the
The California Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that this issue is unresolved. Cook,
441 P.3d at 922 (citing People v. Rodriguez, 417 P.3d 185, 190 (Cal. 2018)) (“Finally, as we have
before, we express no view on whether a Franklin proceeding is constitutionally required.”)
78. Franklin, 370 P.3d at 1064–65.
79. 417 P.3d 185 (Cal. 2018).
80. Id. at 190; see also People v. Tran, 20 Cal. App. 5th 561, 570 (2018) (holding that a
defendant sentenced before Franklin was decided was presumed to have received an inadequate
opportunity to present mitigation evidence).
81. Cook argued, reasonably, that since an effective parole hearing was all that stood between
him and freedom, the lack of a Franklin hearing affected the conditions of his confinement and was
therefore a perfect subject for a habeas petition. See Answer Brief on the Merits at 10–11, In re
Cook, 441 P.3d 912 (Cal. 2019) (No. S240153), 2017 WL 4001660.
82. See id. at 8–9.
83. See id. at 11–12.
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client’s behalf. Instead, the “bundling” defense attorney gathers an
undifferentiated mass of pre-trial records—probation reports, juvenile
delinquency records, DCFS records, and letters of support—and
submits them to the court with a brief motion, asking the court to
submit the documents to the Board of Parole Hearings. It’s fast, it’s
inexpensive, and it avoids any confrontation with the prosecution over
the moral character of the client.84

84. The Second District Court of Appeal recently sanctioned this approach in a published
opinion, People v. Sepulveda, No. B289160, 2020 WL 1545789 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2020). Travis
Sepulveda, a defendant sentenced for three attempted murders he committed at age eighteen, and a
murder he committed at age twenty-one, claimed that he had a constitutional right to a live Franklin
hearing, rather than the detailed and comprehensive mitigation memorandum his attorney
submitted to the trial court, out of the presence of both Sepulveda and the prosecutor. Id. at *1. The
court held that: (1) the defendant had no right to a live hearing at sentencing; and (2) there is no
constitutional due process right to a Franklin proceeding; all rights flow from the statutory right
created by the legislature. Id. However, nothing this Article says about live hearings as a best
practice is affected by the ruling in Sepulveda. For example, one benefit of a live hearing would
have been that the judge would have had to state on the record why or why not Sepulveda’s
mitigation evidence affected his sentencing decision. However, the Sepulveda court categorically
dismissed this imputed purpose, stating instead that “[t]he purpose of providing an opportunity to
present youth-related factors mitigating culpability is not to influence the trial court’s discretionary
sentencing decisions but to preserve information relevant to the defendant’s eventual youth
offender parole hearing.” Id. at *5.
This statement is frankly misplaced, applying the post-conviction holdings of Cook and
Rodriguez to the issue of mitigation evidence at sentencing. Taking the court’s reasoning to its
logical conclusion, trial courts are still free to oversentence youth offenders, just as they did thirty
years ago, secure in the knowledge that Franklin evidence—introduced only after sentencing—
will influence the parole board, but not trouble the sentencing court itself. This is a troubling
conclusion. Nothing in the Franklin opinion suggested that its holding was confined to postconviction litigation. In fact, the issue in Cook was whether Franklin applied at all in postconviction. Cook, 441 P.3d at 917. It seems strange that the California Supreme Court would create
a special proceeding, designed to remedy the lack of mitigation evidence at a juvenile offender’s
original sentencing, and then also hold that this new, remedial hearing, going forward, would have
no effect on a judge’s sentencing decisions.
Sepulveda was convicted of three counts of attempted murder, and one count of firstdegree murder he committed when he was eighteen and twenty-one years old, respectively. Id. at
*1. He was sentenced to an aggregate indeterminate prison term of ninety years to life. Id. During
sentencing proceedings, Sepulveda’s attorney stipulated to a written Franklin mitigation evidence
submission and declined to present any live testimony. Id. at *1–2. The Franklin evidence, a
mitigation report authored by an appointed capital mitigation investigation expert, psychological
and educational assessments, school records, and interviews with Sepulveda’s family, would be
submitted to the court “about three weeks or a month” after Sepulveda’s sentencing. Id. at *2–3.
The court proceeded with Sepulveda’s sentencing without consideration of any Franklin evidence.
See id. at *3.
Sepulveda appealed, seeking remand for a Franklin hearing. Id. at *1. He argued,
“Franklin is, in essence, an aspect of the sentencing hearing and, as such, directly implicates a
defendant’s fundamental due process rights, including to be present at the hearing, to present a
defense and to cross-examine witnesses—rights that cannot be waived by counsel without the
client’s consent.” Id. at *5. The Second District held the opposite—that the rights Franklin affords
defendants are statutory in nature and do not implicate a defendant’s constitutional rights, at all. Id.
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Many defense attorneys and public defender offices favor this
method of presenting mitigation evidence.85 There’s no point in doing
more, they argue. Doing a full-blown hearing is ruinously expensive
for already cash-strapped public defender offices—it takes valuable
time away from zealously representing defendants at the trial level,
and it annoys judges. Finally, what if the People finally notice what’s
going on and start cross-examining our experts or presenting their own
reports? Our psychologists’ opinions about causative factors are just
speculation, paper-thin supposition that will never withstand the
brilliance of line deputies and their rapier-like trial skills. Better to
quietly submit the documents and bypass the hearing process. Why do
more?
None of these vital issues of attorney competence and diligence
are discussed in Cook, and nor should they be. The California Supreme
Court is not the place to define what an advocate ought to do in a triallevel court. On the other hand, trial-level attorneys also have no
business arguing that the California Supreme Court took away rights
from a defendant seeking Franklin relief. Yet pleadings have already
been filed in California courts by prosecution offices, arguing that the
California Supreme Court has severely curtailed the rights of Franklin
movants, despite the fact that none of that prosecution-friendly
language finds support in the Cook opinion.
On the other hand, Cook does not provide much support for
diligent defense attorneys, either. True to its practice, the court seems
content to leave much of the detail work to the superior court.
Attorneys on both sides will have to thrash out those details, and much

The court further held that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in accepting defense
counsel’s stipulation to a written Franklin submission. Id.
The California Supreme Court has not ruled on whether the lack of a Franklin proceeding
violates due process. Moreover, Sepulveda does not vacate Medrano or Carranza, where other
appellate courts declared that an insufficient Franklin hearing at sentencing could be cured by a
1203.01 motion post-conviction. See People v. Medrano, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 653 (Ct. App. 2019);
People v. Carranza, No. A152211, 2019 WL 5867435 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2019).
The court also ruled that, if Sepulveda wanted to argue ineffective assistance of counsel
by his attorney for failing to demand a live hearing, he could file a petition for writ of habeas corpus
(though the court helpfully suggested several strategic reasons why the attorney wouldn’t want a
live hearing). Id. at *6.
85. In San Bernardino County, where In re Cook originated, live hearings are discouraged.
The process is designed to be streamlined, with as much documentation as possible submitted with
the original motion. See Directive, Superior Court of Cal., Cty. of San Bernardino, Procedures for
Franklin Proceedings (June 5, 2019) (on file with authors).
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of that thrashing will take place at a local level, where custom and
judicial habit are almost as important as black letter law.
But let’s for a moment take the side of the bundlers, and ask the
obvious question: “who cares?” Is it necessary to employ experts,
solicit reports, and engage with the court and the prosecutor? Does the
client need it? Does the Board of Parole Hearings need it? Does the
court need it? Why all this pointless theater?
The answer is this: there’s more at stake in a Franklin hearing
than the proper transmission of mitigation evidence to the Board of
Parole Hearings. Those stakes are not immediately apparent from the
Franklin opinion, and they are certainly not mentioned in Cook, but
the remedy in Franklin implicitly addresses them. These stakes can be
summarized as a triad of institutional realities that will be familiar to
any attorney who practices in California.
First, there is the fact that California trial court judges have
historically heard very little mitigation evidence during the sentencing
phase of a trial. Why would they? Judges had very little discretion
under the sentencing laws of the 1990s, though they had more
discretion than many judges were willing to admit.86 After a
conviction on a serious or violent felony, a judge’s only option in
many cases was to stack gang and gun enhancements, along with
determinate sentences, on top of an already long sentence or series of
sentences. As noted above, functional life without parole—that is, a
sentence of fifty years to life or longer—was all too common, even as
crime rates plummeted. Most of the judges sitting on superior court
benches were ex-prosecutors themselves, and they knew how much
power was in the hands of felony trial deputies.
Second, trial defense attorneys have historically agreed with those
judges. For judges to hear mitigation evidence, defense attorneys must
gather and present it. As sentencing laws became more and more
draconian, and prosecutors acquired almost unlimited plea-bargaining
power, defense attorneys began to despair. Many behaved as if their
jobs were finished when the verdict was announced. They were
86. See Jon’a Meyer & Paul Jesilow, The Formation of Judicial Bias in Sentencing:
Preliminary Findings on “Doing Justice”, 22 W. ST. U. L. REV. 271, 279 (1995) (noting that after
the 1976 implementation of determinate sentencing laws in California, judicial discretion at
sentencing was so limited that California judges admitted to using “a variety of methods to expand
their discretion, including refusing plea bargains, assignment of offenders to probation and
community service, creative interpretation of statutes, and recommendations to the probation
department to allow alternative placements for mandatory sentences”).

(7) 53.2_HAWTHORNE (DO NOT DELETE)

396

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

6/2/2020 5:02 PM

[Vol. 53:373

supported in this belief by the other institutional actors. These authors
have read too many appellate records where the only sentencing
papers were filed by the prosecution, and the defense had almost
nothing to say on the defendant’s behalf.
Finally, Franklin addresses another reality of youthful offender
parole hearings: it is highly unlikely that appointed parole counsel will
gather mitigation evidence. They are incapable of it, both
institutionally and financially. Social histories, psychological reports,
prison adjustment reports, and institutional evidence in the form of
educational records, DCFS records, and foster care reports are beyond
the scope of the appointment, and the state is not offering any help,
financial or otherwise.
In more detail, the next Part covers these three institutional
limitations, and how the Franklin proceeding can ameliorate them.
ATTITUDES TOWARD FRANKLIN
Perhaps it would help to return to our original question: do postconviction Franklin hearings matter at all? The word “hearings” is
used advisedly, because the question is really two questions: does
Franklin matter, and do hearings matter?
An easy answer to the first question is: if the Franklin proceeding
didn’t matter, the California Supreme Court would not have created it,
and would not have chosen trial courts as the venue for these
mitigation hearings. Franklin clearly states that its antecedents are not
the regulations or decisions of the California Department of
Corrections, but the California legislature and the courts of review,
including the United States Supreme Court.87 The California Supreme
Court did not direct parole attorneys to gather evidence and present it
to the Board of Parole Hearings; it directed trial attorneys to present
evidence to trial courts.88 That makes sense: mitigation evidence is
generally presented in the trial court; mitigation evidence should have
been presented in the trial court. So, by creating the Franklin
proceeding, the California Supreme Court is, in effect, saying: you
broke it, you fix it, and the Board of Parole Hearings can reap the
benefits of the additional evidence.

87. People v. Franklin, 370 P.3d 1053, 1060 (Cal. 2016).
88. See In re Cook, 441 P.3d 912, 922 (Cal. 2019).
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It is therefore understandable that prosecutors would bridle at the
thought of being forced to dig up old transcripts, justify earlier
sentencing decisions, and generally endure the wholesale
humanization of juvenile offenders who had previously been
sentenced as if they were monsters. It is also understandable that
judges, their dockets already strained by court consolidation, would
not want to waste precious time on a hearing where they don’t even
get to make a ruling.
What is less understandable was the defense bar’s lack of passion
for rethinking or rearguing juvenile justice. A Franklin proceeding,
properly litigated, is a way to explore the connection between social
forces, psychological factors, and juvenile culpability, and to do it in
full view of the institutional actors who make decisions based on
juvenile culpability: judges, prosecutors, commissioners, probation
officers, and defense attorneys. The hearings, though they will not
change a single sentence, might shed some light on the legal and
cultural forces behind the thirty-year effort to lock up thousands of
youths in California prisons.
But a large part of the defense bar, perhaps beaten down by years
of powerlessness in the face of absolute prosecutorial discretion,
seems to have little appetite for restarting the conversation about
juvenile sentencing. These authors have heard it frequently in Los
Angeles trial courts: “Franklin? That useless remedy?” said one parole
attorney. “Much ado about nothing,” scoffed a defense attorney in a
branch court, who was, in fact, handling several Franklin proceedings.
“I can present any facts I want to at a parole hearing, without worrying
about the Rules of Evidence. What do I need a court proceeding for?”
asked another post-conviction attorney.
But if recent history has taught us anything, it is that democratic
norms matter, and that much of what we call “the law” is in fact a
cluster of entrenched customs that change, not only as the result of
legislation or appellate law, but also in response to repetitive practice
at the local level. This repetitive practice is often defined as “judicial
discretion” or “prosecutorial discretion,” with that term’s aroma of
well-deserved power. But really, repetitive practice is less a matter of
absolute power than a cluster of unspoken beliefs, held in common by
institutional actors. In other words, the decisions that prosecutors,
judges, and defense attorneys make in day-to-day practice, and the
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reasons for those decisions, matter as much as the laws that give them
the latitude to make those decisions in the first place.89
This, in fact, ought to be the promise of Franklin: that it can
change the assumptions that provide the foundation for repetitive
decision-making in court practice. This promise is partly the necessary
result of having no recourse to any other promises. Franklin changes
no sentences, releases no inmates from prison, requires no
explanations from prosecutors, and requires no judge to justify an
earlier sentencing decision. If none of these more concrete goals are
available, then the Franklin proceeding must take refuge in the less
tangible goals of changing the conversation about juvenile offender
culpability. On the other hand, it is also arguable that, without a change
in this conversation, all the statutes, regulations, and appellate
opinions will be insubstantial, impermanent gestures. Not only will
there be little change in the criminal courts, the little change that does
occur will fade away with the first uptick in the crime rate. So, the
answer to both questions is yes. Franklin matters, because it changes
the conversation about youth crime, and hearings matter, because it’s
not a conversation if one institutional actor submits documents and the
other actors silently accept them.
Others would argue that Franklin’s promise is, in fact, not
intangible but concrete. Specifically, the proceeding is concretely
aimed at the Board of Parole Hearings because Franklin promises a
proceeding to supplement the record that exists solely for the its use.
In fact, Franklin states this clearly:
The goal of any such proceeding is to provide an opportunity
for the parties to make an accurate record of the juvenile
offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time of
the offense so that the Board, years later, may properly
discharge its obligation to “give great weight to” youthrelated factors . . . in determining whether the offender is “fit

89. Professor John F. Pfaff argues that the discretion of a single institutional actor—the county
prosecutor—is primarily responsible for oversentencing, so perhaps some customs are more
entrenched than others. See, e.g., PFAFF, supra note 11, at 70 (“What we call the criminal justice
system is, in practice, a mishmash of independent, often competitive bureaucracies, all attentive to
different constituencies . . . . In fact, when we break the criminal justice ‘system’ into its constituent
parts, a striking fact stands out . . . prosecutors have been the ones who are most responsible for
overall prison growth.”).
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to rejoin society” despite having committed a serious crime
“while he was a child in the eyes of the law.”90
Going with this view of Franklin, it makes sense not to simply
“bundle” documents but also to avoid live hearings, since the intended
target of Franklin is not courts, but the Board of Parole Hearings. It is
true, the Board of Parole Hearings is the ultimate destination for
Franklin evidence, and the most tangible result—namely, parole—
will be felt there.
The authors of this Article come down squarely on one side of
this debate: we believe that, to be effective, a Franklin proceeding
must include three components: first, mitigation evidence that is
summarized and curated, preferably in expert reports that analyze the
client’s history, commitment offense, and potential for rehabilitation;
second, a comprehensive mitigation memorandum that distills the
mitigation evidence in an analytical structure based on the five factors
enumerated in Miller; and third, a live hearing, where the experts can
explain their opinions, deal with cross-examination, and answer any
questions the court may have. Anything less will offer incomplete
Franklin relief. To buttress this argument, here, in more detail, are the
three institutional realities that make Franklin hearings necessary.
JUDICIAL CONTEXTUALIZATION
In Franklin, at issue are not only the rights of youthful offenders
facing parole hearings, but also the rights of the youthful offenders of
the future, sitting in the courtrooms of judges who sentenced their
fathers, older brothers, and uncles to long sentences. Many of the
judges who sentenced juvenile offenders to long sentences are still on
the bench, and the judges who came after them are often former felony
prosecutors who argued for those original sentences. Over the last
thirty years, these judges and prosecutors have been the most
important institutional actors in the overincarceration of youth. In
thousands of cases, prosecutors have argued that children who commit
crimes are irredeemable. They have pointed at juvenile defendants and
described them as “monsters,” “dead inside,” “completely without
moral understanding,” and “deserving of the death penalty.” Judges
have echoed those arguments in their pronouncement of sentences,
90. Franklin, 370 P.3d at 1065 (citations omitted) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,
79 (2010)).
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often invoking “the will of the people” or the fact that “the legislature
has spoken.” Although judges and prosecutors must acknowledge
changes in the law, it takes years—sometimes decades—to change
judicial and prosecutorial habits. The only way to change those habits
is to counter thirty years of repetitive oversentencing with an equal
number of years of repetitive evidence of the humanity and
redeemability of juvenile offenders.
Thirty years of mitigation hearings: that sounds crazy. But, as we
gradually awaken from California’s nightmare of mass incarceration,
it is helpful to remember that the nightmare did not happen overnight.
Rather, it was the result of the repeated condemnation of youth in the
news, in politics, in schools, on television, and in the courts.91 After
thirty years of that barrage, how can any judge believe—really believe,
with her own senses—that youthful offenders are redeemable, without
repeatedly seeing the evidence of that in their courtrooms? In the
opinion of these authors, judges need to see the redeemability of
juvenile offenders in the flesh. And not just once, but dozens, even
hundreds of times. Otherwise, what judge would believe that the
“irreparably corrupt” juvenile offender was, in the words of Miller,
“rare”?92 Why would she not believe that the true rarity was the
juvenile offender whose crime reflected “transient immaturity”? Why
would the judge not believe that the few rehabilitated offenders she
saw in her courtroom were just exceptions, and that overall, she had
made the right decision in 99 percent of her cases?
Based on their past decisions, statements, and asides to court
counsel, trial judges are not going to see redemption in the sullen,
angry, seventeen-year-old defendant, sitting through a long felony
trial, twiddling his thumbs and staring at the ceiling. In order to do
that, those judges would have to extend their understanding of the
juvenile offender, into the past and into the future. They would have
to see the totality of this distracted, affectless creature. What did his
home life look like? How much violence did he experience daily? Did
he have any cognitive limitations or mental illness, not enough to
91. See, e.g., The Super-Predator Scare, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), https://nyti.ms/1h505w1
(detailing the misguided statistical analysis and moral panic that gave rise to the “super-predator”
scare of the 1990s). Some experts argue that the super-predator myth is making a comeback, with
constitutionally suspect gang suppression initiatives. Alex Vitale, The New ‘Superpredator’ Myth,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/23/opinion/superpredatormyth.html.
92. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2012).
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render him incompetent, but enough to damage his choosing
mechanism? What was this youthful defendant like when he wasn’t
experiencing the daily chaos of the streets? And finally, what might
happen to this person in twenty years? Would the defendant mature,
calm down, and become thoughtful, insightful, and self-aware? Or
would he still be acting like an adolescent: impetuous, angry, and
immature? Did he have a future, and could the court help guarantee
that future by validating his humanity and his worth?
THE LIMITED HORIZON OF PAROLE HEARINGS
There is also a practical dimension to a Franklin hearing, and it
bears on the realities of the parole process in California prisons—
realities that the Franklin court seemed to implicitly acknowledge.
First, parole attorneys—particularly those who are paid by the
state—have no time, money, or energy to conduct independent
mitigation investigation. They have their hands full just dealing with
their client’s prison records and the upcoming hearing. They also have
little time to read a thick sheaf of pre-trial documents without even an
executive summary to give them guidance. Finally, they are
shockingly underpaid: rarely more than $400 per client, regardless of
the complexity of the case.93 Most juvenile offenders seeking parole
will be represented by appointed parole attorneys.
Second, the realities faced by appointed parole attorneys apply
doubly to parole commissioners. Parole hearing officers—both
commissioners and the deputy commissioners who work with them—
conduct up to twenty hearings a week, followed by parole
consultations, all at the same prison. Their days begin early in the
morning, and frequently end well after nightfall. Lifer parole hearings
take anywhere from one to five hours, depending on their complexity.
For each hearing, a parole commissioner must read thousands of pages
of prison records, as well as a Comprehensive Risk Assessment, any
submissions by the potential parolee, and the transcripts from every
prior parole hearing. The last thing a parole commissioner needs is a
93. See
CAL.
DEP’T
OF
CORR.
&
REHAB.,
Attorney
Invoicing,
https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/bph/attorney-overview/invoicing/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2020) (detailing a
“menu” of attorney tasks, with assigned dollar amounts). In 2020, for the first time, California
parole panel attorneys will get a raise, to a flat rate of $750 per client, irrespective of case
complexity—enough to do a competent job at a hearing, but not remotely enough to do independent
mitigation investigation. See CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., Application Process for New
Attorneys, https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/bph/attorney-overview/application/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2020).
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mass of undigested documents, many of which may be duplicated in
the existing file. And yet, that appears to be the strategy employed by
many public defender offices.
The bottom line is, the Franklin proceeding bears a heavy historic
burden. With no other remedy on the horizon, it is perilous to act like
we can short-change this one. And yet—with that blithe amnesia so
characteristic of California—that’s exactly what we are doing.
It doesn’t have to be that way. Defense counsel have the energy,
and the courts have the resources, to do Franklin proceedings in a way
that meaningfully honors the rights of juvenile offenders. Here’s how:
HOW TO DO A FRANKLIN HEARING
The best practices for representing a youthful offender in a
Franklin proceeding are not particularly complex, nor should they be
unfamiliar. They are the same best practices that a competent attorney
would employ for a juvenile sentenced to life without the possibility
of parole, pursuant to Miller. After all, what Tyris Lamar Franklin was
seeking was not a Franklin hearing, but a Miller hearing. The
difference—the only difference—is that a Franklin hearing lacks a
judicial ruling. Attorneys argue; objections are made, overruled, and
sustained; witnesses testify under oath; and pleadings are exchanged.
That the judge is essentially a disinterested referee should not cause a
great deal of consternation. Judges are often required to be
institutionally passive.
The first thing an attorney must do to initiate a Franklin
proceeding is file a motion94 under the original caption and case
number, in the original sentencing court.95 The motion should set forth
the eligibility requirements for a Franklin proceeding: (1) that the
client was under twenty-six at the time of the commitment offense; (2)
that the client is entitled to a Youthful Offender Parole Hearing under
California Penal Code sections 3051 and 4801 and an indication when
that hearing is scheduled to take place; and (3) that the trial court did
not consider youth-related mitigation evidence at the sentencing
hearing.96 Although the proper vehicle for a Franklin proceeding after
94. Following Cook, this document is termed a “motion” pursuant to California Penal Code
section 1203.01, but it contains the same allegations and arguments as a Franklin petition.
95. In re Cook, 441 P.3d 912, 922 (Cal. 2019).
96. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801(c) (West Supp. 2019). Following Rodriguez and Tran, any
sentencing hearing that took place before Franklin was decided on May 26, 2016, is presumptively
inadequate. Supra note 80.
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Cook is a motion instead of a petition, the procedure after filing the
motion remains the same. Just as in pre-Cook and pre-Franklin
proceedings, the district attorney may oppose the motion if it believes
the client has already had an opportunity to make a record of youthrelated mitigating evidence at the time of sentencing, and the court
may exercise its discretion in how it wants to conduct the proceeding.
However, if the client meets the eligibility criteria listed above, he is
entitled to this proceeding,97 and any objections or challenges to the
client’s right to a Franklin proceeding should be relatively easy to
overcome.
Preparation for the Franklin proceeding begins with thorough
record collection. Attorneys should collect documentation from the
client’s youth and post-conviction.98 In order to eventually synthesize
youth-related mitigation evidence into a cohesive narrative, an
attorney needs a clear picture of the circumstances surrounding his or
her client throughout the client’s entire life. The records sought should
comprise, but are not limited to the following: the full record on
appeal, including reporter’s and clerk’s transcripts from the original
trial and any appellate or habeas corpus filings; the original probation
report; education records, particularly special education records;
dependency and delinquency records, which may include records from
the Department of Child and Family Services (DCFS); medical
97. In re Cook, 441 P.3d at 917.
98. Some district attorneys argue that the goal of the Franklin remedy is to create a “time
capsule,” and the proceeding should only allow presentation of evidence from the time that the
client committed his crime. They argue that any post-conviction evidence is irrelevant to the
proceeding.
It is true that, following Cook, the court in a Franklin hearing may “exercise its discretion
to conduct [the proceeding] efficiently, ensuring that the information introduced is relevant,
noncumulative, and otherwise in accord with the governing rules, statutes, and regulations.” In re
Cook, 441 P.3d at 922 (quoting People v. Rodriguez, 417 P.3d 185, 190 (Cal. 2018)). However, the
fact that a court has the discretion to not consider certain evidence is not an adequate reason not to
present the evidence in the first place.
The only difference between the Miller remedy Tyris Lamar Franklin sought and the
remedy the court created in the Franklin proceeding is that there is no judicial sentencing decision.
The Franklin proceeding contemplates the same five Miller factors, including the fifth factor—
which allows the client to present all relevant evidence bearing on the distinctive attributes of youth,
including post-conviction efforts at rehabilitation. Moreover, under Franklin, the client must be
given an opportunity to make a record of evidence relevant to the Board of Parole Hearings at his
eventual youthful offender parole hearing. People v. Franklin, 370 P.3d 1053, 1064 (Cal. 2016)
(“[I]n order to provide such a meaningful opportunity, the Board “shall give great weight to the
diminished culpability of juveniles as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any
subsequent growth and increased maturity.”). Thus, post-conviction evidence of rehabilitation is
not only relevant, but is essential to the mitigation presentation at a Franklin proceeding.
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records; and finally, the client’s Central file (“C-File”) from the
institution at which she is currently housed.
Depending on the client’s age, some of these records may have
been lost, destroyed, or be difficult to locate. However, it is imperative
that the attorney seek out as many records as possible because they
will ultimately inform the attorney’s decisions about what kinds of
experts are the best equipped to evaluate and testify on behalf of the
client. For example, an attorney who finds through medical records
that his cognitively impaired client sustained a severe head injury as a
child might seek out an expert who specializes in traumatic brain
injury to best evaluate that client. Or, for a client who has had no
apparent cognitive impairment or mental health concerns, but who
endured severe childhood trauma, an attorney may seek out a licensed
clinical social worker or social historian to best evaluate the client.
The attorney should carefully read the records she is able to obtain,
and glean from them significant themes, patterns, or events in the
client’s life.
The foundation for a fruitful Franklin proceeding is a
comprehensive psycho-social life history, often referred to as a “social
history.” The social history can be written by a social worker, attorney,
investigator, anthropologist, psychologist, academic, or law student,
and should present an in-depth study of the client’s life. To generate a
high-quality social history, the author must do an exhaustive review
of the available records, interview the client in person, and interview
the client’s family and friends, again in person.99 The social history
should ultimately contain information that is relevant to the factors
present during the client’s childhood and the client’s subsequent
growth and maturity.100 It can be organized topically or
chronologically, can include images or visual representations of data,
and should highlight significant events in the client’s life. Depending
on who is best suited to write the social history, an attorney may seek

99. The authors have heard anecdotal reports of social historians substituting questionnaires
for in-person interviews with clients or family members. Needless to say, this deprives the social
historian of valuable information—demeanor and affect, not to mention effective follow-up
questions—that she would gather during an in-person interview.
100. The social history, like many of the components of a Franklin proceeding, grows out of
death penalty litigation. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533–36 (2003) (counsel’s failure to
investigate and complete a competent social history for a defendant facing the death penalty was
ineffective assistance of counsel).
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appointment through the court, hire an independent social historian, or
use an in-house specialist.
After the social history is complete, based on its content, the
attorney may choose to seek appointment of an additional expert.
There are various reasons the attorney may choose this path. First, and
most commonly, the person generally appointed to write the social
history is not credentialed to make diagnoses—there are some
diagnoses only medical doctors can make. For example, if there are
indications that the client has struggled with mental illness or
cognitive impairment, it may be beneficial for a doctor to do a targeted
clinical evaluation of the client and make a diagnosis. There are other
types of experts that may be advantageous in a Franklin proceeding,
like gang experts and prison adjustment experts. However, attorneys
should be strategic and thoughtful about the court’s stated or apparent
willingness to appoint multiple experts.
Once all reports and evaluations are complete, the attorney should
meet with her expert to discuss the report’s findings and conclusions
and prepare for in-court testimony. The court may allow multiple
experts to testify, but in the case that it will only provide funds for one
expert to appear in court, attorneys should choose the expert whose
testimony will be most advantageous to the client at his youthful
offender parole hearing.101
After meeting with the expert and reviewing all the finalized
reports, the attorney should file a statement in mitigation in advance
of the actual Franklin proceeding. Like a sentencing memorandum in
a Miller hearing, the statement in mitigation should contextualize the
evidence in terms of the five Miller factors.102 Although there is no
sentencing decision in a Franklin proceeding, the goal is to clarify for
the court and, eventually, the Board of Parole Hearings, how the
client’s youth affected his participation in the crime and how he has
grown and rehabilitated since his conviction. The statement in
101. In some cases, the court may deny the request to appoint an expert entirely. This denial is
erroneous and would result in a constitutionally defective Franklin hearing and a Fourteenth
Amendment due process violation. As the court held in Doe v. Superior Court, indigent defendants
have a constitutional right to retain a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate
examination and assist in the “evaluation, preparation, and presentation” of the defense. 45 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 888, 892 (Ct. App. 1995). An attorney should be ready to litigate this matter but should
also be cognizant of her client’s appetite for lengthy appellate litigation.
102. Some attorneys prefer to use the three factors listed in California Penal Code sections 3051
and 4801, but because Franklin is a judicial remedy, there is something to be said for the five
judicial factors developed in Miller and Gutierrez.
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mitigation should attach as exhibits the social history, the expert
report, and any underlying documentation used to support it. This
filing should be submitted to the district attorney and the court at least
two weeks before the hearing to give the district attorney a chance to
respond, if he or she is inclined to do so. It will also give the court time
to digest the information contained in the reports.
The next strategic decision the attorney and client must make is
to determine whether the client wishes to be present at the Franklin
proceeding, or whether he chooses to waive his appearance. This
decision can be quite difficult for clients who have invested a great
deal of time and energy in creating a routine in state prison.
Transportation to the county jail for court might result in the client
losing his place in a specific self-help class or vocation. It may mean
he will spend weeks in a crowded, more chaotic environment,
surrounded by strangers, and potentially in danger.
There are, however, potential benefits for the client if he chooses
to appear in court. First, the court is likely to allow the client to
allocute, or to make a statement of remorse, from the defense table. If
a client can make a record of remorse at his or her Franklin
proceeding, the Board of Parole Hearings will be able to see early
evidence of remorse and insight.103 Additionally, because of the
remote location of many of California’s state prisons, it is likely that
the county jail facility is closer to family and friends and would allow
the client to see his loved ones more often.
Most significantly, a client who is present for his Franklin
proceeding can see and hear, for the first time, the complete narrative
that should have been developed at the time of his sentencing. At the
time the client was sentenced, the only narrative presented in the
courtroom was the story of the crime. Trial courts relied heavily on
probation reports as evidence of criminal sophistication, gang
membership, and antisocial behavior, and heard testimony from law
enforcement, witnesses, and victims. Clients received exceptionally
long sentences and were never given an opportunity to contextualize
their involvement in the crime. Being present at the hearing can boost
the client’s self-esteem, impart a sense of dignity, and encourage the
client to continue on a rehabilitative path until his parole hearing.
103. In addition to the youth factors that the Board of Parole Hearings must consider, two of
the primary measures of future dangerousness are whether the client possesses insight into the crime
and remorse for his or her actions. In re Shaputis, 190 P.3d 573, 585 n.18 (Cal. 2008).
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At the Franklin proceeding, an attorney may request that the court
allow her to make a brief opening statement to frame the proceeding.
The court will then hear the live witness testimony, and the district
attorney may cross-examine the witness or witnesses. The attorney
may request that she be able to make a brief closing argument and then
she should request that the court transmit the transcript from the
proceeding and the written submissions to the California Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The Franklin materials should be
placed in the client’s C-file, so the Board of Parole Hearings has access
to it at the time of the client’s youthful offender parole hearing. The
court should also order that the client be removed back to state prison
as quickly as possible.
CONCLUSION
After In re Cook, very little has changed legally. Defendants still
have the right to conduct an “evidence preservation procedure,” and
although habeas corpus is no longer the entry point for that procedure,
the nature of the evidence “preserved” is the same.104 The court
liberally quoted its earlier decisions in Franklin and Rodriguez, and
still permits the possibility of actual hearings.105 Whatever any
interested party may have hoped or feared, the demise of the House of
Franklin has been greatly exaggerated. Aside from a new door and
some new signage, the interior is basically unchanged.
Or perhaps the right word is “unrenovated.” Because, despite
having opportunities to do so, the court did nothing to strengthen the
effectiveness of Franklin hearings or better define what procedures
and documents would satisfy the dictates of Miller and its progeny.
Reports? Testimony? A personal statement from the defendant? An
on-the-record finding that the client is or is not permanently
incorrigible? The court did note that a defendant who found the
process inadequate could file a petition for writ of habeas corpus but
gave no guidance as to what might be adequate.106 The court gave the
power to judges to “conduct this process efficiently” and to exclude
evidence if it does not “meaningfully add[] to the already available
record.”107 Judges may also decide “whether testimony is
104.
105.
106.
107.

See generally In re Cook, 441 P.3d 912 (Cal. 2019).
Id.
Id. at 914.
Id. at 922.
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‘appropriate’ or if other types of evidentiary submissions will
suffice.”108
What this means is that the House of Franklin is a real do-ityourself project. The renovation skills of each defense attorney will
come into play, and there will be no waiting for the legislature or the
California Supreme Court to come in with a wrecking ball. If defense
counsel doesn’t like the popcorn ceiling of “documents only”
submissions, that ceiling can and should be demolished. For the
diligent attorney, the reward will be a well worth it: a hitherto
concealed, spacious, and ornate second story of genuine mitigation
evidence. All the successful Franklin attorney needs are commitment,
training, and elbow grease.
Without those three things, however, the Franklin attorney will
soon find out that the house—so promising at the entrance—is
cramped, inadequate, and shabby with a nice, low ceiling, but no floor
to slow down the headlong race to the basement.

108. Id.

